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ABSTRACT 
Policing has become an integral component of urban life.  New models of proactive policing 
create a double-edged sword for communities with strong police presence.  While the new 
policing creates conditions that may deter and prevent crime, close surveillance and frequent 
intrusive police-citizen contacts have strained police-community relations.  The burdens of the 
new policing often fall on communities with high proportions of African American and Latino 
residents, yet the returns to crime control are small and the risks of intrusive, impersonal, 
aggressive non-productive interactions are high.  As part of the proffered tradeoff, citizens are 
often asked to view and accept these invasive tactics as a necessary means to the ends of reduced 
crime and improved public safety. This paper examines the degree to which urban residents’ 
show a willingness to engage in a “rights tradeoffs” and sacrifice their civil liberties to maintain 
public safety. Using a telephone phone survey of 960 New York City residents, we find little 
openness to rights tradeoffs tied to perceived neighborhood danger. However, respondents who 
see the police as legitimate and effective in producing safety are more likely to support such 
tradeoffs.  The results suggest that trust in the police can give them wide berth to infringe on 
civil liberties in the interest of crime control, regardless of local crime conditions, the 
abrasiveness of police contact, and the extent and type of the intrusions on privacy and liberty. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
For people in cities, and especially in neighborhoods with elevated crime rates, the police 
are more than the face of the state: the presence of the police reflects both the political belonging 
of residents in the liberal democratic state, but also the state’s controlling interest in maintaining 
security (Soss and Weaver, 2017).  Police produce order and safety, providing an amenity to the 
everyday lives of citizens. In turn, police are an integral component of urban life, with the 
potential to drastically improve or safeguard the well-being of city residents (Skogan & Frydl, 
2004).  Yet, that view of police is now contested, and varies according to the extent and quality 
of citizen contacts with police.  In an era when proactive and often aggressive policing is widely 
used (Weisburd and Majmandur, 2017), particularly in urban areas and their neighborhoods with 
the highest crime rates, policing may be seen as a dis-amenity and a negative feature of 
neighborhood ecology.  When policing is experienced as unnecessary, abusive and degrading, 
citizens may distance themselves from the police and develop perspectives that reject the 
underlying norms and moral authority of the police (Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Hough et al., 2010; 
Jackson and Gau, 2016).  Whether policing is seen as an amenity or disamenity varies both with 
the policing tactics and the lived experiences of residents who interact with police. 
Police are indeed present in the everyday lives of people, and their place in the social 
ecology of urban life, is borne out by estimates from both population and survey data. The 2011 
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Police-Public Contacts survey shows that that more than a quarter of the adult population (26%) 
had one or more involuntary contacts with the police in the preceding year (Langton & Durose, 
2013).  A survey of Chicago public school students found that approximately half had been 
stopped, questioned, and “told off or told to move on” by ninth or tenth grade (Shedd, 2015).  
Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth shows that by age 18, the cumulative 
arrest prevalence rates1 range from 30.2-41.4% (Brame et al., 2012, 2014). Data from a new 
population-based survey of urban teens indicate that more than 20% report personal experience 
with the police, and 75% report knowing someone with police contact or witnessing a police stop 
(Geller, 2018). 
At the same time, police are an important deterrent of crime (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011), 
though the empirical link between the presence of police and specific policing tactics is uncertain 
and contingent on the policing tactics applied.  Beyond crime control, police also provide 
important services that go well beyond their primary crime control mission.  Police are often first 
responders in a variety of circumstances, from fire and safety to responding to emotionally 
disturbed persons or family crises, tasks that take an emotional and psychological toll on police 
(Marmar et al., 2006; Rando et al., 2015).  Police can also play a key role in the legal 
socialization of residents of the cities (Justice and Meares, 2014; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & 
Fagan, 2008; Tyler, Fagan, & Geller, 2014). Residents who have positive experiences with the 
police, in which they feel they have been treated fairly and respectfully, tend to place more trust 
in the police as an institution, which in turn, has the potential to increase police-public 
cooperation, and encourage citizen participation in the production of public safety (Meares, 2014 
Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Kirk & Papachristos, 2011).  Yet here too is a seeming contradiction: 
whatever the returns of policing to public safety, there may also be incursions on dignity and 
privacy that for many can produce mental health symptoms including trauma, anxiety and stigma 
(Geller, Fagan, Tyler and Link, 2014; Sewell and Jefferson, 2016; Sewell, Jefferson, and Lee, 
2016).  
Several empirical studies have shown how these tensions shape the responses of citizens 
to the police and their assessments of police legitimacy (Meares, 2002; Trinkner, Jackson and 
Tyler, 2017). These studies focus on evaluations of the police, while other research examines 
how these evaluations influence law-related behaviors including cooperation and compliance 
(Tyler and Fagan, 2008; Berg et al., 2016). In this paper, we extend this question to a broader 
normative assessment: how citizens balance or comparatively weight their privacy and liberty 
rights relative to the promise of security by police, and whether these rights are fungible in an 
exchange for their safety (Whitman, 2003); Bayley, 2002; Sargeant, 2017; Solove, 2007; Popkin 
et al., 1995). Courts often weigh the balance between liberty and security in deciding the limits 
of police authority to contravene privacy rights in the interest of public safety (Pratt v. Chicago 
Housing Authority, 1994; Gutierrez et al. v. City of East Chicago, 2016).  Courts have invoked 
the necessity of deference to law enforcement interests to ensure public safety in navigating the 
balance of privacy rights and safety and tolerating incursions of Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights, Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
rights (c.f., United States. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 1975;   Whren v. United States, 1996; Johnson, 
2009.). 
Our question arises from the experiences of over five million New Yorkers during the era 
of intensive stop-and-frisk activity from 2004-2014 who were stopped by the New York City 
Police Department (Floyd v City of New York, 2013).  Citizens often were detained on the street 
at low levels of suspicion; the constitutionality of the majority of those stops was questioned and 
ultimately rejected by the Floyd court.  The Floyd court also cited sharp racial imbalances in the 
this practice (Fagan et al., 2010; Fagan, 2017a). Most of these stops entailed temporary 
detentions, some involved force by police, but rarely increased public safety by resulting in 
arrests or seizures of contraband (White and Fradella, 2016; Fagan, 2010, 2012). The stops often 
were degrading and verbally if not physically abusive (Howell, 2009). Persons stopped by the 
police elsewhere reported similar interactions, including physical assaults, degrading language, 
unnecessary or even gratuitous use of force, yet rarely resulting in arrests or recovery of guns or 
other contraband (Brunson and Weitzer, 2010; Harcourt, 2004; Epp, Maynard-Moody and 
Haider-Markel, 2014; Jain, 2015; Rios, 2011; Bowers, 2014). In addition to legitimacy costs to 
the police, young persons stopped by the police exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress, 
anxiety and stigma (Geller, Fagan, Tyler and Link, 2014). 
During this era, police officials and supporters have suggested that low-level police 
contact may deter crime (Smith & Purtell, 2008; Weisburd, Wooditch, Weisburd, & Yang, 
2016), and as such, is instrumental to maintaining public safety in high-crime neighborhoods 
(MacDonald, 2012). Other studies have questioned either the practical or statistical significance 
of the marginal policing effects on crime (Rosenfeld and Fornango, 2014; MacDonald, Fagan 
and Geller, 2016), and suggest that the costs to legitimacy and cooperation among the most 
intensively policed citizens may offset these minor gains in public safety (Weisburd et al., 2016). 
Other studies suggest that this form of proactive policing can produce large reductions in crime, 
but only when the majority of police contacts are conducted at a high bar of constitutional 
compliance (Fagan, 2016). Despite these realities, residents of heavily policed areas have been 
encouraged to consider police intrusion a “fact of urban life”, and to consider any associated 
imposition on civil liberties a small price to pay in exchange for the resulting improvements to 
public safety (Williams, Fromer, Fagbenle, & Stein, 2012). 
Explicit in this message was the notion that at least a partial tradeoff of equal protection, 
privacy rights and dignity for increased safety was a bargain that was required by one’s presence. 
The increased surveillance and police activity in non-white areas was incorporated into this 
algebra with the explanation that minority citizens were also the primary beneficiaries of police 
activity (c.f., MacDonald, 2010); Zimring, 2011).   
Here, we examine the extent to which residents in fact were willing to make the 
exchanges proposed by the proponents of the aggressive policing policies of the past 20 years.    
We analyze evidence from New York City, but the experiences of these residents are not unique 
to experiences in other cities across the U.S. (Fagan and Richman, 2017).  We ask how policing 
affects the political and normative choices of citizenship among people living in communities 
where both crime and police are constant presences, each potentially intruding on their privacy, 
dignity and security. 
A. Proactive Policing 
Despite the importance of policing as a determinant of public safety, the role of the police 
in American cities has been an increasingly contentious topic over the past two decades 
(Harmon, 2012). Many cities have shifted to “proactive” (Kubrin, Messner, Deanne, McGeever, 
& Stucky, 2010; Weisburd and Majmandur, 2017) and “Broken Windows” (Heymann, 2000; 
Kelling & Coles, 1996; Wilson & Kelling, 1982) policing models, which emphasize the active 
engagement of residents at low levels of suspicion, in order to detect imminent criminal activity. 
In this “new policing”, police use investigative stops, arrests, and citations to disrupt low-level 
disorder, or other circumstances interpreted as indicia that crime is afoot (Kelling & Coles, 1996; 
Kubrin et al., 2010; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). However, the vast majority of these encounters do 
not result in arrest, citation, or the seizure of contraband (Fagan, 2010; Fagan, Conyers, & Ayres, 
2014), suggesting that most people stopped by the police have done nothing wrong (Herbert, 
2010; Morrow, White, and Fradella, 2017). Such encounters are also characterized by stark racial 
disparities in many cities, with the greatest burden of police contact falling on racial and ethnic 
minority residents (American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, 2015; Ayres & Borowsky, 2008; 
Bailey et al. v. City of Philadelphia et al., 2011; Fagan, et al., 2016) and neighborhoods (Fagan 
and Davies, 2000; Fagan, Davies, & Carliss, 2012; Fagan, Geller, Davies, & West, 2010; Geller 
& Fagan, 2010). 
These low-level, racially disparate encounters, coupled with high-profile incidents of 
police violence (Hagelskamp, Friedman, Rizzolo, Rinehart, & Schleifer, 2015; Krieger, Chen, 
Waterman, Kiang, & Feldman, 2015) and misconduct (Rayman, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c), have the 
potential to compromise perceptions of police legitimacy (Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Fagan, 
2008), and threaten community health. (Geller, Fagan, Tyler, & Link, 2014; Sewell & Jefferson, 
2016; Sewell, Jefferson, & Lee, 2016).  
B. Public Safety and Support for Civil Liberties 
Throughout American history, citizens have expressed unequivocal support for civil 
liberties (e.g., the rights to free speech, assembly, and due process) and related democratic 
principles (McClosky & Brill, 1983; Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell, & Tetlock, 1996); however, 
this support has repeatedly been compromised in the face of apparent threat (ibid.). Despite, for 
example, widespread rhetorical support for the freedom of expression and the freedom to hold 
unpopular views, Stouffer (1955) found, in the era of McCarthyism, that an overwhelming 
majority of Americans (nearly two-thirds) supported the firing of employees who were admitted 
communists, even if this view held no bearing on their ability to do their job. The compromise of 
civil liberties in response to threat goes back further; fears of invasion during World War II led 
to the internment of 120,000 Japanese-Americans (Vasi & Strang, 2009). An extensive literature 
in political science (Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964; McClosky and Brill 1983; Gibson 
1988; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1993; Sniderman et al. 1996; (Vasi & Strang, 2009) finds 
similar ambivalence; the “rights for safety” tradeoff called for by NYPD supporters among 
residents of high-crime, heavily policed areas, is foreshadowed throughout American history. 
Vasi and Strang (2009) review the literature and identify a variety of personal 
characteristics associated with support for civil liberties, even in the face of perceived threat. 
Community leaders and politically active citizens demonstrate greater support (giving rise to the 
“elite theory of democracy”), as do those with greater levels of formal education. Residents of 
urban areas also show greater support. Finally, they find some evidence of political influence on 
support for civil liberties (though mixed results related to party affiliation), with self-described 
liberals showing more support than self-described conservatives. 
Vasi and Strang (2009) also note that the tolerance for civil rights impositions is likely to 
be tied both to trust in the individuals and institutions implementing these impositions, and the 
distribution of burden that might be imposed. Their analysis examined resistance to the USA 
PATRIOT Act, which gave state actors extraordinary powers of surveillance, which largely led 
to impositions on the civil liberties of immigrants and members of minority groups. They noted 
support for entrusting these extraordinary powers to state actors would likely be contingent on 
faith that they would be wielded wisely. They also posited that support for these impositions (and 
accordingly, resistance to these impositions) revolved in part around principles of inclusivity, 
and definitions of “us” and “them”: they anticipated that a portion of the citizenry would be 
tolerant of impositions that were borne disproportionately by members of minority groups that 
they were not associated with (i.e., “them”, rather than “us”).  
This discussion of tradeoffs between indices of self-interest, like safety, and 
commitments to symbolic political values such as privacy mirrors a larger long-standing 
discussion regarding the role of self-interest in shaping policy attitudes.  The symbolic politics 
literature (Sears, Lau, Tyler, & Allen, 1980) argues that it is longstanding symbolic attitudes, and 
not immediate self-interest concerns, that shape public values.  For example, whether a person 
might use unemployment insurance does not shape whether they support it.  And, whether one 
has been a crime victim or feels their neighborhood is not safe has only a minor relationship to 
support for law and order policies. Similarly, crime experiences and fears are only weakly related 
to support for the death penalty (Tyler & Weber, 1982) and fear of terrorism has little impact 
upon attitudes regarding how to police Muslim neighborhoods among either Muslims or non-
Muslims (Huq, Tyler, & Schulhofer, 2011). The degree to which it would be expected that 
personal concerns or experiences with crime would shape attitudes about police practices is 
unclear.  
While the role of symbolic concerns in shaping policy attitudes is well researched (as in 
the studies above), the role of self-interest in police-community relationships may manifest in 
either of two ways, or a combination thereof. On one hand, people who perceive their 
neighborhoods to be dangerous may be willing to sacrifice their civil liberties in the hopes that 
some of their perceived danger will be eliminated. However, residents of high-crime, heavily 
policed neighborhoods may perceive the police to be a threat that they face beyond the risk of 
crime. In such a case, residents at the greatest risk of police contact might indicate less 
willingness to sacrifice their rights. The range and strength of self-interest impacts on attitudes 
toward the police continues to be issues of contention (Weeden & Kursban, 2017). 
Underlying the tensions in the rights-safety tradeoff is the question of whose rights.  
Much of the policing controversy of the past two decades, through the recent era of the new 
policing, is based on the question of how less powerful groups, those most intensively policed, 
can hold accountable the law enforcers whose actions can deprive them of their basic freedoms 
of movement and association.  Meares (2002) points to the tension between extent of the crime 
problem that burdens less powerful and disadvantaged groups, which requires some form of state 
intervention and control, and the potential of that intervention to – unintentionally - spill over 
into punishment.  Punishments in this case range from unnecessary detentions and dignity 
incursions to stigma to violence.  When disadvantaged groups are asked to sacrifice basic 
constitutional protections against such punishment with uncertain returns to their own security 
poses risks that shape their views toward the rights tradeoff.  One might expect that these groups 
would evaluate the rights tradeoff in the context of their shared sense of everyday injustices 
(Tyler and Huo, 2002; Fagan, Tyler and Geller, 2014; Fagan, 2017b). While we know that these 
experiences erode their views of police legitimacy and weaken cooperation with the police, we 
have less understanding of how these concerns are elevated to a broader view of their own 
citizenship, the rights they deserve and the rights they believe they are accorded, and their 
compliance with the social contract.   
These are distant concerns for the less disadvantaged groups with less experience with 
the police, but more urgent for those who have greater police contact and who live in the shadow 
of crime and violence.  The counterfactual to the normative view is that the most intensively 
policed citizens may evaluate the tradeoff not in terms of rights, which may be more abstract 
concerns, but in more personal terms about their own safety, regardless of the liberty threats to 
themselves or their community.  Navigating this distinction is one of the challenges to this 
research.  
C. Current Hypotheses 
This paper explores the willingness of urban residents to tolerate impositions on civil 
liberties – and specifically, to trade their civil liberties and tolerate police misconduct (hereafter, 
to engage in “rights tradeoffs”) in the interest of public safety. Using data collected in a 
population-based survey of New York City residents, we test three hypotheses: First, based on 
the long American history of compromising civil liberties in the face of perceived threat, we 
hypothesize that New Yorkers will report greater are more willing to engage in rights tradeoffs if 
they perceive that their neighborhoods are dangerous. Second, as Vasi and Strang (2009) posit 
that support for the USA PATRIOT Act would be tied to faith that the government would use its 
powers wisely, we hypothesize that New Yorkers will report greater willingness to engage in 
rights tradeoffs if they consider the police to be legitimate. Third, expanding on the Vasi and 
Strang (2009) concern about “us versus them” distinctions in the distribution of burden, and the 
role of self-interest in attitudes toward policing, we hypothesize that New Yorkers will report 
greater willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs if they perceive intrusive policing as targeting 
“them” rather than “us” – or specifically, if they have little personal experience with the police, 
and are at minimal risk of having their own rights violated.  
II. METHODOLOGY 
A. Data Source 
We conducted a phone survey of 960 New York City residents in the summer of 2012, 
just after the peak of the NYPD’s Stop and Frisk activity, but before the precipitous decline 
observed following the Floyd v. City of New York decision (City of New York, 2016). We used a 
stratified sampling plan that divided the city into 146 “neighborhood clusters” and classified 
clusters into deciles based on the number of stops the police recorded in 2008 and 2009. Clusters 
were randomly selected for sampling within each decile, with a systematic oversample of high-
stop clusters, but including neighborhoods from all 10 deciles of stop activity. Respondents were 
selected to be between 25 and 65 years old. This age range was deliberately chosen to be older 
than the majority of people stopped by the police (Fagan, 2010; City of New York, 2016), but in 
an age range more closely associated with civic engagement, in efforts to assess opinions among 
a population that elected leaders would consider to be their core electorate.  
Data were collected by phone between June and November 2012. Phone numbers were 
chosen from a mix of random digit dial and consumer lists that identified both landline and 
cellular numbers more likely to be associated with addresses in the targeted neighborhoods, and 
respondents in the desired age range.  The survey took approximately 25 minutes, and 
respondents received a $15 gift card for their participation. The AAPOR response rate was 
between 2 and 3 percent, with a cooperation range between 9 and 12 percent. These rates are 
lower than the national averages for 2012 (9% and 14%, respectively – see Pew Research Center 
for People and the Press, 2012), reflecting likely reluctance of residents in heavily policed areas 
to talk to surveyors about their views of the police (Botero et al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2016; 
Schulenberg et al., 2017).    
B. Key Measures 
1. Support for Rights Tradeoffs 
Respondents’ willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs was measured in two ways. First, 
respondents were asked explicitly about their views on the tradeoff between public safety and 
their civil liberties and given the option to choose one of four responses that best summarized 
their views: 
1. Respecting my rights is the most important concern. 
2. I would sacrifice some of my rights in order to ensure safety from crime. 
3. It’s important to balance rights and safety, even if it means compromising a little on each. 
4. There is no reason to choose. We can have our rights and the police can keep us safe at 
the same time. 
We coded a binary indicator of respondents’ willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs, 
which was equal to one if respondents selected the second response option (i.e., “I would 
sacrifice some of my rights…”), and zero if respondents selected any of the other three options. 
A sensitivity analysis includes the third response option (i.e., “It’s important to balance rights 
and safety, even if it means compromising a little on each.”) as a second indicator of willingness 
to trade off. 
We also constructed a scale measuring respondents’ tolerance for officer misconduct 
(α=.94), based on eight questions in which respondents could indicate agreement (on 5-point 
Likert scales) with statements that “It’s ok for the police to break the law in a [stop/frisk] if [a 
variety of circumstances held].” These circumstances, asked as potential justification for 
breaking the law in a stop or frisk, included: 
1. if it prevents crime. 
2. if it helps find criminals. 
3. if it helps get rid of guns. 
4. if it makes young men think twice about committing crimes. 
Responses were coded from 0-4 on each question, with higher values indicating more tolerance 
for officer misconduct in the course of stops and frisks. 
2. Hypothesized Determinants of Willingness to Engage in Rights Tradeoffs 
As noted, we test several hypotheses related to respondent willingness to engage in rights 
tradeoffs. First, we hypothesize that respondents will be willing to sacrifice their civil liberties in 
the face of perceived threat; we test this empirically by measuring respondents’ perceptions of 
their neighborhoods as unsafe. Respondents indicate on a 5-point Likert scale their perceptions 
of their neighborhoods, ranging from “very safe” to “very unsafe” with “very unsafe” indicating 
the greatest perception of threat. Second, we hypothesize that respondents will be willing to 
engage in rights tradeoffs if they see the police as legitimate; we measure perceptions of 
legitimacy using an additive scale (α=.74) based on responses to four questions: whether the 
NYPD: 
1. follows the law in deciding who to stop 
2. treats people they stop with respect 
3. stops people without a good reason, and  
4. treats people differently based on their race. 
Each response was coded on a 5-point Likert scale, and coded so that higher values indicate 
greater confidence in the legitimacy of the NYPD.  
Finally, we hypothesized that respondents will report greater willingness to engage in 
rights tradeoffs, and greater tolerance for police misconduct if they are at minimal risk of 
actually being forced to trade off their rights or experience police misconduct – specifically, if 
their own exposure to the NYPD or aggressive policing practices was limited. We include four 
indicators of respondents’ exposures to aggressive police practice:  
1. A binary indicator of whether they have been stopped by the police in the past year 
2. The number of times they were stopped in the past year 
3. Their perception of whether the NYPD stops many young people in their neighborhood 
(based on a six-point scale, respondents were coded as 1 if they said the NYPD stopped 
“almost all” or “a lot” of young people in their neighborhoods, or 0 if they said the 
NYPD stopped “some”, “very few”, “almost none”, or “none” of the young people in 
their neighborhood.) 
4. A binary indicator of whether they had ever seen someone stopped. 
Notably, despite a strong conceptual link between these four indicators of police contact, they are 
not highly correlated. The maximum correlation between any two of these indicators is 0.41, 
between a respondent having witnessed a stop, and the response that the NYPD stops “almost 
all” or “a lot” of the young people in their neighborhood (other pairwise correlations between 
these indicators range from 0.15 to 0.39).  
3. Potential Confounders 
We consider our hypotheses in the context of several demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics commonly associated with exposure to, and attitudes toward the police. We 
control for respondent sex (male/female), race and ethnicity (white, black, Hispanic, Asian, 
multiracial, or “unknown”), educational attainment (less than high school, high school graduate, 
some college or post-high school training, or college graduate), and a binary indicator of whether 
the respondent lived in public housing at the time of the survey (Fagan et al., 2012). 
4. Analysis Sample 
Our analysis is based on two separate analysis samples: We examine respondent 
willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs among the 934 respondents who provided an answer to 
the relevant survey question. We examine respondent tolerance for police lawbreaking based on 
the 885 respondents providing answers to all of the questions in the relevant scale. In each 
analysis sample, missing data on predictor values was imputed for 25 imputation datasets, using 
the mi impute chained procedure in Stata. Nearly all covariates have fewer than 10% of 
observations imputed, with one covariate (whether the NYPD stops “most” or “a lot” of young 
people in the neighborhood) imputed on 12% of observations.  
C. Modeling Approach 
We predict respondent willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs through a series of 
logistic and OLS regression models of our two outcomes. For each outcome, we estimate a set of 
five models. The first, baseline model estimates willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs as a 
function of respondent demographic and socioeconomic characteristics: 
(1) Y = β0 + βX + ε   
where X = the vector of covariates described above. 
We next estimate a model predicting the extent to which respondents express willingness 
to trade off their rights as a function of their fear of neighborhood crime. Specifically, Model 2 
examines the relationship between willingness to trade and respondents’ perceptions of 
neighborhood danger. 
(2) Y = β0 + β1DANGER + βX + ε 
Our third model tests the hypothesis that respondents will express willingness to engage 
in rights tradeoffs if they believe the police will use their powers wisely – or specifically, if they 
perceive the NYPD to be legitimate.  
(3) Y = β0 + β1LEGIT + βX + ε 
Our fourth model tests the hypothesis that respondents will express willingness to engage 
in rights tradeoffs if they, personally, are at minimal risk of having their rights violated as a 
result. As noted, we operationalize this hypothesis using respondent reports of whether they were 
stopped by the police in the past year, the number of times, whether they have witnessed stops of 
young people, and whether they think the NYPD stop “a lot” or “almost all” of the youth in their 
neighborhoods. 
(4) Y = β0 + β1STOPPED + β2NUMSTOPS + β3WITNESS + β4YOUTHSTOPS + βX + ε 
Finally, we estimate a model testing our three hypotheses simultaneously. Model 5 tests 
the extent to which respondents report willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs based on the 
simultaneous influences of fear of crime, trust in police legitimacy, and limitations in their own 
exposure to police practices. 
(5) Y = β0 + β1DANGER + β2LEGIT + β3STOPPED + β4NUMSTOPS + β5WITNESS + 
β6YOUTHSTOPS + βX + ε 
It bears noting that because data were collected in a single cross-section, the possibility 
exists that long-standing background characteristics, or experiences that predate data collection, 
may drive respondents’ perceptions of their neighborhoods and the police, their personal 
experience with the police, and their willingness to trade off their civil liberties. We therefore do 
not interpret our findings causally, but rather, simply as indicia of which respondents might be 
more or less likely to engage in rights tradeoffs. 
D. Sensitivity Analyses 
We test the sensitivity of our estimated relationships to several of our analytic choices. 
First, we consider the possibility that observed relationships (or the lack of significant 
relationships) are driven by our choice of correlated predictors; we compute variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) of each predictor to identify potentially problematic multicollinearity. We also test 
whether our results would substantively change if key predictors were more conceptually 
distinguished within our models. We re-estimate Model 4 and Model 5, which test our 
hypothesis relating respondents’ thresholds for rights tradeoffs and police misconduct and their 
personal exposure to police contact. In one re-estimation, we measure exposure to the police with 
a specific focus on recent personal contact (whether the respondent was stopped in the year 
leading up to the survey, and how many times), and in another we measure police exposure 
based on respondent perceptions of police activity in their neighborhood (whether the respondent 
reports that the NYPD stops “most or all” of the young people in their neighborhood, and 
whether the respondent reports witnessing a police stop.).  
We test the sensitivity of our findings to our coding of one of our outcome measures: 
respondents’ willingness to trade off their civil liberties in the interest of public safety. In this 
analysis, we construct a more inclusive definition of willingness to trade, in which a respondent 
is coded as willing to trade if they either indicate that they “would sacrifice some of [their] rights 
to ensure safety from crime”, or that they responded “It’s important to balance rights and safety, 
even if it means compromising a little on each”. This more inclusive measure identifies more 
than twice as many respondents (33%) as willing to engage in rights tradeoffs, and we assess the 
extent to which estimated predictors of willingness to trade are robust to this alternate outcome. 
We next assess the extent to which our findings might be driven by our multiple 
imputation strategy for dealing with missing data. We re-estimate models of each of our 
outcomes using a series of “complete case” samples, including only the respondents who provide 
all relevant data for each model. Finally, we assess the extent to which our findings might be 
driven by differences between the neighborhoods in which respondents live. To test this we re-
estimate each of our models to include fixed effects for respondents’ neighborhood of residence. 
Results from these models will indicate whether the relationships observed across our entire 
sample, which may be driven by between-neighborhood differences, are also observed between 
respondents living in the same neighborhoods. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Sample Description 
A description of the 866 survey respondents included in both our analysis samples is 
provided in Table 1. As anticipated given the strategic oversample of high-stop neighborhoods 
(which tend to be minority neighborhoods), the sample contains a greater proportion of minority 
residents than the city as a whole. Respondent ages span the 25-65 range of our selection criteria, 
with an average age of 47.3. Our sample is slightly more educated than the city as a whole, with 
88% reporting having completed high school, including 42% who reported completing college or 
an advanced degree. 19% of the sample reports living in public housing, which is notable given 
the additional discretion that police officers are granted to exercise aggressive police practices in 
public housing. 
Respondents report substantial exposure to the NYPD: 30% of respondents report that 
they were stopped in the year leading up to their interview; those stopped reported an average of 
3.3 stops in that time. More than half of respondents (60%) reported having witnessed an NYPD 
stop, and 28% reported that the police stopped “a lot” or “almost all” the young people in their 
neighborhoods. When asked about their willingness to trade off their rights, 14% reported that 
they would sacrifice some of their rights to improve public safety. Tolerance for police 
misconduct ranged widely, with nearly 10% reporting strong agreement with all statements that 
“it’s okay for the police to break the law…” in stops and frisks under certain circumstances, over 
15% reporting strong disagreement under all circumstances, and the remainder of the sample 
distributed between the two (mean = 14.3). 
B. Model Results 
Results from logistics regression models predicting respondent willingness to engage in 
rights tradeoffs are presented in Table 2. We see little evidence that respondents will trade off 
their rights in the face of perceived neighborhood danger; as shown in Model 2, respondents who 
report feeling unsafe in their neighborhoods are no more likely to report willingness to trade off 
than those who feel safe. Model 5 indicates a slight increase in willingness to trade off among 
those feeling unsafe; however, this difference is only statistically significant at the P<.10 level. 
Perceptions of police legitimacy, on the other hand are consistently and significantly related to 
respondents’ willingness to trade off their rights; respondents reporting that they see the NYPD 
as more legitimate have increased odds of reporting willingness to trade off.  
The relationship between respondent exposure to the NYPD and willingness to trade off 
is more complex, as shown in Models 4 and 5. Respondents who report being stopped in the past 
year are significantly more likely to report willingness to trade off their rights (counter to our 
hypothesis). This relationship is diminished with every additional stop the respondent has 
experienced; however the declining willingness to trade among respondents experiencing more 
stops is only marginally statistically significant (P<.10). Respondents reporting that the NYPD 
stops “a lot” or “almost all” of the young people in their neighborhood were also significantly 
less likely to report willingness to trade off their rights (in Model 4); however, this relationship 
was statistically insignificant in the combined model that also considered perceived NYPD 
legitimacy and neighborhood danger (Model 5). Finally, we found no significant difference in 
the odds of willingness to trade between those who had and had not witnessed an NYPD stop. 
Estimates from OLS models estimating respondents’ threshold for police misconduct are 
presented in Table 3. As with the binary measure of willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs, no 
empirical support exists for the hypothesis that people who perceive their neighborhoods as 
dangerous will be more likely to tolerate police misconduct. Likewise, perceptions of police 
legitimacy remain a strong and consistent predictor of respondents’ reported tolerance for the 
police breaking the law under certain circumstances. The relationship between respondents’ 
exposure to the NYPD and tolerance for police lawbreaking is somewhat stronger than the 
relationship observed between personal exposure and the binary indicator of willingness to trade 
off one’s rights. Respondents reporting that the police stop a lot or almost all of the young people 
in their neighborhoods report significantly lower tolerance for misconduct than their 
counterparts. However, this relationship is statistically insignificant in the “combined” model.  
Examining observed covariates suggests that black respondents are less tolerant of police 
misconduct than white respondents, though the association is only statistically significant in a 
subset of models predicting tolerance for police misconduct. Notably, Hispanic respondents (and 
in some models, Asian respondents) report greater tolerance for police misconduct than white 
respondents do. We also observe that more educated respondents (those with more education 
than a high school degree) have significantly lower tolerance for police misconduct in stops and 
frisks; however, college-educated respondents are more likely to report willingness to trade off 
their rights, a difference that is marginally statistically significant (P<.10). 
C. Sensitivity Analyses 
We tested several alternative measurement and modeling approaches in order to assess 
the robustness of our findings. An examination of our OLS and logistic regression models, and 
the potential for variance inflation due to multicollinearity suggests that multicollinearity is 
unlikely to have a substantial impact on our estimates; Table 4 presents the Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIFs) of each predictor variable. The VIF does not exceed 2 for any of our predictors; 
each VIF is far below 10, the generally accepted threshold for problem multicollinearity 
(Menard, 1995). Nonetheless, we anticipate that the four predictors in Model 4 are at least 
conceptually related. The sensitivity analysis examining alternate, more conceptually distinct, 
definitions of police exposure is presented in Table 5. This table includes our re-estimations of 
Models 4 and 5 to focus, alternately, on respondents’ personal experience with the NYPD 
(whether they had been stopped in the past year, and the number of times), and on respondents’ 
perceptions of what NYPD officers do in their neighborhood (whether they had seen someone 
stopped, and whether they thought the NYPD stopped a lot or almost all young people). Table 5 
indicates that the findings in Tables 2 and 3 are largely robust to these alternate specifications. 
When focusing only on personal contact, a re-estimation of Model 4 indicates that the 
relationship between the number of stops respondents have experienced in the past year and both 
their willingness to trade off their rights, and their threshold for police misconduct, becomes 
statistically significant at P<.05. However, as in our initial estimation, neither of these 
relationships remain statistically significant when perceptions of NYPD legitimacy and 
neighborhood danger are also considered. In each estimation of Model 5, perceptions of NYPD 
legitimacy remain a strong and statistically significant predictor, and perceptions of 
neighborhood danger remain unrelated to respondents’ acceptance of rights tradeoffs and police 
misconduct. 
Results from models examining our more inclusive measure of “rights tradeoffs” are 
presented in Table 6. As in the more limited model of rights tradeoffs presented in Table 2, 
perceptions of NYPD legitimacy are the most consistently significant predictor of willingness to 
engage in our more inclusive measure. Likewise, perceptions of neighborhood danger remain 
unrelated to respondents’ willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs. Similarly, respondents 
reporting that the NYPD stop lots or most of the young people in their neighborhood are less 
willing than their counterparts to engage in rights tradeoffs; however, none of the other measures 
of personal exposure to the NYPD are significant predictors of this measure of willingness to 
trade. 
We next explored whether the results presented in in Tables 2 and 3 were driven by our 
imputation of missing data. Complete case models, provided in Tables 7 and 8, indicate that the 
estimated relationships (significant and insignificant) are substantively robust to our choice of 
missing data strategy. As in the multiple imputation models, our complete case findings indicate 
that perceptions of police legitimacy are the strongest and most robust predictor of respondents’ 
willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs, and threshold for police misconduct. Perceptions of 
neighborhood danger are marginally associated with willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs and 
tolerate police misconduct (P<.10), but this association is not statistically significant at 
traditional levels. The relationship between personal exposure to the police and willingness to 
engage in rights tradeoffs remains inconsistent, and does not change substantively from the 
multiple imputation findings.  
Finally, we tested the extent to which our observed predictors of respondents’ willingness 
to engage in rights tradeoffs was sensitive to controls for neighborhood conditions. Tables 9 and 
10 present results from a replication of the models in Tables 2 and 3, but including neighborhood 
fixed effects. Notably, our main substantive results are unchanged with the inclusion of fixed 
effects: respondents who perceive the NYPD as more legitimate are significantly more likely to 
report willingness to engage in rights tradeoffs, and show significantly more tolerance for the 
police bending the law in the interest of public safety. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A. Findings and Implications 
As often observed throughout American history, despite normative support for the moral 
norms and principles of civil rights in the past half century, there are circumstances under which 
people are willing to see those rights compromised for themselves and others. We explored these 
circumstances using a household survey of New Yorkers near the peak of the NYPD’s Stop, 
Question, and Frisk activity. Despite past literature and history suggesting that rights are 
compromised in the face of imminent threat, we find very little relationship between 
respondents’ perceptions of threat within their neighborhoods, and their willingness to 
compromise their civil liberties. Rather, we see that the respondents willing to compromise civil 
liberties in the interest of public safety are those who simultaneously perceive the police to 
exercise their powers with legitimacy. These contradictory results comport with the extensive 
empirical literature on the unevenness of trust in government among Americans, including both 
the powerful and the disadvantaged (Cook and Gronke, 2005).  
Relatedly, we observe an inverse relationship between perceived police legitimacy and 
threshold for police misconduct, suggesting that respondents are most willing to tolerate police 
breaking the law in the interest of public safety, only if they think the police exercise their 
authority in a lawful, race-neutral, and respectful manner (and presumably, that such violations 
will be relatively rare and equitably imposed).  Trust in police and tolerance for police 
misconduct, then, seems to be contingent on evaluation of the congruence between police values 
and those of the citizens they protect and control.  Tolerance of police wrong-doing has some 
elasticity, which expands or contracts depending on the comportment of police in the course of 
their intrusions on liberty.  Hidden in this finding is the central importance of police 
effectiveness, one of the important components of police legitimacy: police deviation from legal 
actions is tolerated so long as it is done without animus or aggression.  Conceptually, procedural 
features of police interactions loom in the background of the tradeoff decision.   
Finally, we find inconsistent evidence that respondents are less likely to report 
willingness to trade off their rights, or tolerate police misconduct, if they have greater exposure 
to the police; presumably for these respondents (particularly, those stopped multiple times by the 
police, and those who report frequent stops of youth in their communities) the imposition created 
by the loss of civil liberties is more personally known, the tradeoffs described in the survey 
questions are more than hypothetical. Respondents therefore report less tolerant for such 
tradeoffs. On the other hand, respondents who report having been stopped, but report only 
limited exposure to the police, report greater willingness to trade off their rights.   
Our findings suggest that those supporters of invasive policing tactics who justify such 
invasion with the reasoning that “people want more” (Kelly, 2012), or that it provides “a 
freedom from assault” (MacDonald, 2013) may be disconnected from the personal experiences 
of those stopped by the police – particularly those stopped on an ongoing basis. Even staunch 
proponents of proactive policing have acknowledged that “[b]eing stopped when you are 
innocent is an infuriating, humiliating experience” (MacDonald, 2013), and an extensive 
literature on police contact finds that such humiliation is associated with diminished perceptions 
of police legitimacy (Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Meares, 2014; Tyler, 2004; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; 
Tyler et al., 2014; Tyler & Huo, 2002). It is therefore highly unlikely that the cited calls for more 
police intrusion come from those individuals personally affected by intrusive police practices, 
and such reasoning must be carefully re-evaluated.  This underscores the important of legitimacy 
as a mediator of the tradeoff.  Research in similar policing contexts suggests that people are 
unlikely to voluntarily consent to or approve of such incursions absent a strong measure of moral 
duty and obligation, but are less likely to approve of coerced incursions on liberty if rooted 
solely on an instrumental concern for safety (Jackson, Bradford, MacQueen, and Hough, 2016).  
Beyond the specific issue of policing, these findings support a symbolic perspective on 
policies. The results suggest that immediate needs or fears of neighborhood danger do not drive 
policy preferences or normative judgments.  Rather, people support giving the police authority 
when they perceive the police are legitimate, and will tolerate some misconduct under those 
conditions. Prior studies on the police show that perceived legitimacy is related to judgments 
about the fairness with which the police exercise their authority (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler, 
Fagan & Geller, 2014; ).  In other words, legitimacy is not simply a response to instrumental 
judgments about the police (they control crime; they deliver desirable outcomes).  On the 
concrete level of police contact and on the more general level of community wide evaluations of 
the police people show that same sensitivity to values that they show when making safety-
privacy tradeoffs. 
It is particularly noteworthy that extensive personal contact with the police, and police 
presence in one’s neighborhood, is marginally associated with diminished willingness to cede 
authority to the police in the name of crime control and safety. Recent discussions of policing 
have focused upon the lack of public trust in the police, particularly within minority 
communities.  Low levels of trust have been associated with a variety of negative outcomes, 
including increased criminal conduct, reduced willingness to cooperate with the police, and a 
greater likelihood of going outside the law to manage conflicts (Tyler, Fagan & Geller, 2014; 
Tyler & Jackson, 2014; Jackson and Gau, 2016). To the extent that extensive personal contact 
with the police is associated with diminished community trust, the style of aggressive policing 
widely exercised in American cities threatens to undermine support for police policies and 
practices among members of the public. 
B. Limitations 
Our findings to date are limited by features of both our data collection protocol and the 
assumptions underlying the analytic  models. First, as previously noted, our survey is limited by 
low response rates, and it is unclear to whom our findings might generalize. Our sampling plan 
was developed to focus on heavily policed neighborhoods, and residents of heavily policed 
neighborhoods may be reluctant to discuss local police activity for fear of reprisal (Botero et al., 
2013). Residents who do choose to participate in a household survey, despite these disincentives, 
and spend approximately 25 minutes on the phone with an interviewer, are likely to differ from 
their neighbors in important ways, observable and unobservable. Those who participated 
reported relatively high rates of contact with the police; 30% report having been stopped by the 
police in the year before their survey, and 60% report having witnessed an NYPD stop. The 
extent to which these experiences and others impact the generalizability of our findings is 
unclear. 
In addition, our data were collected in a single interview from each respondent. Cross-
sectional data is ill-equipped to assess causal relationships, as observed associations may be 
spuriously induced by long-standing characteristics of individuals and their communities, and the 
ongoing relationships between individuals, communities, and the police. Moreover, our models 
are limited by the correlation between our predictors: the number of stops experienced by 
respondents is likely tied to their perceptions of police legitimacy, and personal characteristics 
such as their race and residence in public housing. Nonetheless, the general consistency in our 
substantive findings across models testing our hypotheses separately, and our combined model, 
suggest that this limitation is relatively minor.  
C. Conclusion 
 Both police leaders and politicians more generally often think about public support in 
instrumental terms, believing that if they control crime and create perceived safety the public 
will not focus on or be concerned about the practices they use to achieve these goals. This paper 
supports the argument that this is not the case within the general community, including the most 
socially and politically disadvantaged. People are sensitive to police legitimacy which involves 
issues of lawfulness and fairness.  Legitimacy encourages deference to the police and acceptance 




Table 1: Sample Description (N=866) 
Sample Characteristic 
Mean [SE]  
or % 
Willingness to Trade off Rights  
Rights Tradeoff Tolerance (binary) 14% 
Police misconduct tolerance (scale, 0-32) 14.3 
 [0.38] 
Experience with NYPD  
Stopped by NYPD, Past Year 30% 
Number of stops, past year (among those 
stopped) 3.3 
 [0.4] 
Number of stops, past year (including zeros) 
1.0 
[0.13] 
Witnessed NYPD stop of young person 60% 
Perceptions of NYPD stops of young people in neighborhood 
NYPD stops no kids 22% 
NYPD stops almost no kids 8% 
NYPD stops very few kids 18% 
NYPD stops some kids 15% 
NYPD stops a lot of kids 19% 
NYPD stops almost all kids 6% 







Two or more races 4% 
Age 47.3 
 [0.4] 
< HS 12% 
HS Only 23% 
More than HS, Not College Graduate 23% 
College or More 42% 
Public Housing Resident 19% 
 
  
Table 2: Willingness to Trade Off Rights, Odds Ratios 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Predictor b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   
Past-Year Stops (any)       2.118 * 2.224 ** 
       [0.633]  [0.669]  
Past-Year Stops (Number)      0.794 + 0.808 + 
       [0.100]  [0.103]  
NYPD stops lots or most kids      0.560 * 0.629  
       [0.158]  [0.186]  
Seen stop take place       1.156  1.263  
       [0.249]  [0.278]  
Perceived NYPD Legit.     1.100 ***   1.104 *** 
     [0.027]    [0.030]  
Perceived neighborhood danger  1.021      1.154 + 
   [0.080]      [0.099]  
Male 1.233  1.237  1.203  1.202  1.156  
 [0.236]  [0.237]  [0.233]  [0.235]  [0.231]  
Black 0.627 + 0.625 + 0.820  0.648 + 0.796  
 [0.152]  [0.152]  [0.209]  [0.162]  [0.205]  
Hispanic 0.990  0.984  1.127  0.990  1.052  
 [0.257]  [0.256]  [0.298]  [0.261]  [0.283]  
Asian 0.566  0.565  0. 489  0.559  0.483  
 [0.357]  [0.357]  [0.312]  [0.353]  [0.310]  
Two or more Races 0.320  0.319  0.304  0.342  0.321  
 [0.239]  [0.238]  [0.229]  [0.256]  [0.242]  
Age 1.007  1.007  1.003  1.003  1.002  
 [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  
< HS 1.502  1.499  1.551  1.540  1.558  
 [0.534]  [0.533]  [0.556]  [0.554]  [0.566]  
> HS but < college 1.498  1.501  1.591  1.446  1.546  
 [0.449]  [0.450]  [0.483]  [0.438]  [0.474]  
College + 1.575 + 1.589 + 1.688 + 1.446  1.648 + 
 [0.429]  [0.434]  [0.465]  [0.398]  [0.461]  
Public Housing 0.892  0.887  0.920  0. 973  0.942  
 [0.246]  [0.245]  [0.256]  [0.272]  [0.267]  
Constant 0.093 *** 0.090 *** 0.030 *** 0.110 *** 0.023 *** 
 [0.048]  [0.047]  [0.018]  [0.059]  [0.016]  
N 934   934   934   934   934   




Table 3: Threshold for Police Misconduct, OLS Coefficients 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Predictor b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   
Past-Year Stops        -0.606  -0.033  
(any)       [0.877]  [0.853]  
Past-Year Stops (Number)      -0.193 + -0.130  
       [0.102]  [0.099]  
NYPD stops lots or most       -2.529 ** -1.082  
Kids       [0.976]  [1.001]  
Seen stop take        -0.318  0.362  
Place       [0.819]  [0.806]  
Perceived NYPD      0.722 ***   0.699 *** 
Legitimacy     [0.085]    [0.095]  
Perceived neighborhood   -0.306      0.395  
Danger   [0.293]      [0.296]  
Male -0.964  -1.024  -1.332 + -0.815  -1.192 + 
 [0.717]  [0.719]  [0.690]  [0.723]  [0.705]  
Black -2.820 ** -2.774 ** -0.827  -2.250 * -0.824  
 [0.906]  [0.907]  [0.904]  [0.918]  [0.911]  
Hispanic 3.161 ** 3.271 ** 4.002 *** 3.489 *** 3.886 *** 
 [1.035]  [1.040]  [1.000]  [1.033]  [1.008]  
Asian 4.699 * 4.737 * 3.616 + 4.330 * 3.489 + 
 [2.169]  [2.169]  [2.089]  [2.151]  [2.091]  
Two or more Races 0.001  0.051  -0.402  -0.153  -0.513  
 [1.982]  [1.982]  [1.907]  [1.967]  [1.911]  
Age 0.105 *** 0.102 ** 0.067 * 0.070 * 0.057 + 
 [0.032]  [0.032]  [0.031]  [0.033]  [0.032]  
< HS 1.659  1.637  1.725  1.881  1.877  
 [1.274]  [1.274]  [1.228]  [1.266]  [1.230]  
> HS but < college -3.021 ** -3.095 ** -2.719 ** -2.939 ** -2.602 * 
 [1.058]  [1.060]  [1.020]  [1.048]  [1.023]  
College + -3.968 *** -4.074 *** -3.583 *** -4.084 *** -3.514 *** 
 [0.950]  [0.956]  [0.915]  [0.944]  [0.925]  
Public Housing -0.544  -0.425  -0.317  -0.220  -0. 326  
 [0.956]  [0.962]  [0.918]  [0.951]  [0.925]  
Constant 12.307 *** 12.760 *** 4.592 * 14.803 *** 5.047 * 
 [1.879]  [1.928]  [2.023]  [1.968]  [2.349]  
N 885  885   885   885   885   




Table 4: Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) of Predictor Variables 
Variable VIF 
College + 1.77 
Black 1.65 
Hispanic 1.56 
> HS but < college 1.54 
NYPD stops lots or most kids 1.46 
< HS 1.40 
Perceived NYPD Legit. 1.36 
Past-Year Stops (any) 1.30 
Seen stop take place 1.28 
Past-Year Stops (number) 1.25 
Perceived neighborhood danger 1.19 
PH Resident 1.15 
Age 1.10 
Two or more races 1.09 
Asian 1.06 
Male 1.06 
Mean VIF 1.33 
NOTE: VIFs obtained using the mivif command, run after Model 5 predicting tolerance for 
police lawbreaking. 
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Specifications of Models Examining Police Exposure  
 Predicting Binary Measure (Odds Ratios) Predicting Scale Measure (Regression Coefficients) 
 Personal Contact Perceptions of N’hood Personal Contact Perceptions of N’hood 
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N 934 934 934 934 885 885 885 885 
NOTE: +P<.10, *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis: More Inclusive Tradeoff Code (base rate = 33%) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Predictor b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   
Past-Year Stops (any)       1.090  1.168  
       [0.199]  [0.215]  
Past-Year Stops (Number)      0.981  0.992  
       [0.029]  [0.028]  
NYPD stops lots or most kids      0.536 ** 0.646 * 
       [0.111]  [0.142]  
Seen stop take place       1.249  1.389 + 
       [0.205]  [0.235]  
Perceived NYPD Legit.     1.097 ***   1.097 *** 
     [0.020]    [0.023]  
Perceived neighborhood danger  0.935      1.023  
   [0.057]      [0.068]  
Male 1.200  1.191  1.163  1.167  1.114  
 [0.171]  [0.170]  [0.169]  [0.170]  [0.165]  
Black 0.773  0.782  1.012  0.811  0.993  
 [0.138]  [0.140]  [0.192]  [0.149]  [0.190]  
Hispanic 0.974  0.992  1.110  0.974  1.062  
 [0.198]  [0.203]  [0.232]  [0.201]  [0.224]  
Asian 1.977 + 1.987  1.809  1.939  1.843  
 [0.794]  [0.798]  [0.740]  [0.783]  [0.759]  
Two or more Races 0.921  0.928  0.893  0.925  0.910  
 [0.362]  [0.366]  [0.358]  [0.366]  [0.366]  
Age 1.014  1.013 * 1.010  1.010  1.009  
 [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.007]  
< HS 1.076  1.084  1.103  1.118  1.131  
 [0.295]  [0.298]  [0.306]  [0.309]  [0.316]  
> HS but < college 1.543 * 1.535 * 1.648 * 1.549 * 1.642 * 
 [0.334]  [0.333]  [0.364]  [0.338]  [0.365]  
College + 1.870 *** 1.837 ** 2.021 *** 1.807 ** 1.988 *** 
 [0.364]  [0.359]  [0.402]  [0.354]  [0.399]  
Public Housing 0.790  0.804  0.808  0. 826  0.823  
 [0.160]  [0.164]  [0.167]  [0.169]  [0.172]  
Constant 0.180 *** 0.196 *** 0.060 *** 0.214 *** 0.055 *** 
 [0.069]  [0.077]  [0.027]  [0.086]  [0.028]  
N 934   934   934   934   934   
NOTE: +P<.10, *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 
 
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis: Willingness to Trade Off, Odds Ratios, Complete Case Sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Predictor b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   
Past-Year Stops (any)       2.647 ** 2.914 ** 
       [0.896]  [1.044]  
Past-Year Stops (Number)      0.738 * 0.761 + 
       [0.109]  [0.114]  
NYPD stops lots or most kids      0.586 + 0.647  
       [0.168]  [0.204]  
Seen stop take place       1.075  1.250  
       [0.237]  [0.300]  
Perceived NYPD Legit.     1.105 ***   1.121 *** 
     [0.028]    [0.032]  
Perceived neighborhood danger  1.040      1.174 + 
   [0.081]      [0.110]  
Male 1.246  1.257  1.410  1.223  1.335  
 [0.240]  [0.243]  [0.293]  [0.248]  [0.293]  
Black 0.592 * 0.589 * 0.750  0.627 + 0.758  
 [0.145]  [0.144]  [0.203]  [0.162]  [0.213]  
Hispanic 0.967  0.951  1.030  0.928  0.919  
 [0.253]  [0.250]  [0.292]  [0.253]  [0.271]  
Asian 0.568  0.563  0.554  0.547  0.531  
 [0.359]  [0.356]  [0.361]  [0.347]  [0.349]  
Two or more Races 0.311  0.308  0.147 + 0.373  0.166 + 
 [0.232]  [0.230]  [0.152]  [0.281]  [0.173]  
Age 1.008  1.009  1.004  1.002  1.001  
 [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.010]  
< HS 1.377  1.371  1.201  1.528  1.286  
 [0.498]  [0.496]  [0.482]  [0.564]  [0.530]  
> HS but < college 1.459  1.483  1.514  1.483  1.490  
 [0.438]  [0.446]  [0.487]  [0.453]  [0.490]  
College + 1.500  1.521  1.642 + 1.288  1.529  
 [0.410]  [0.418]  [0.478]  [0.360]  [0.457]  
Public Housing 0.877  0.871  1.072  0. 989  1.112  
 [0.247]  [0.245]  [0.317]  [0.283]  [0.339]  
Constant 0.093 *** 0.088 *** 0.027 *** 0.128 *** 0.020 *** 
 [0.048]  [0.046]  [0.017]  [0.070]  [0.015]  
N 916   913   830   870   792   




Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis: Threshold for Police Misconduct, OLS Coefficients, Complete Case 
Sample 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Predictor  b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   
Past-Year Stops        -0.765  0.182  
(any)       [0.934]  [0.937]  
Past-Year Stops (Number)      -0.186 + -0.118  
       [0.102]  [0.102]  
NYPD stops lots or most       -3.253 *** -2.119 * 
Kids       [0.976]  [1.015]  
Seen stop take        0.061  0.482  
Place       [0.840]  [0.858]  
Perceived NYPD      0.728 ***   0.713 *** 
Legitimacy     [0.086]    [0.096]  
Perceived neighborhood   -0.226      0.547 + 
Danger   [0.295]      [0.317]  
Male -0.910  -0.954  -1.006  -0.759  -0.990 + 
 [0.722]  [0.726]  [0.723]  [0.750]  [0.758]  
Black -2.689 ** -2.655 ** -0.593  -2.164 * -0.599  
 [0.916]  [0.918]  [0.941]  [0.953]  [0.978]  
Hispanic 3.421 ** 3.498 ** 4.339 *** 3.829 *** 4.132 *** 
 [1.045]  [0.918]  [1.045]  [1.067]  [1.075]  
Asian 4.884 * 4.911 * 3.530 + 4.541 * 3.328  
 [2.170]  [2.172]  [2.215]  [2.154]  [2.222]  
Two or more Races 0.185  0.222  -0.057  -0.173  -0.928  
 [1.984]  [1.986]  [2.000]  [2.062]  [2.077]  
Age 0.105 *** 0.103 ** 0.065 * 0.057 + 0.040 + 
 [0.032]  [0.032]  [0.032]  [0.034]  [0.034]  
< HS 1.426  1.419  1.674  1.183  1.381  
 [1.287]  [1.288]  [1.294]  [1.311]  [1.331]  
> HS but < college -3.157 ** -3.207 ** -2.401 * -2.935 ** -2.362 * 
 [1.068]  [1.072]  [1.066]  [1.081]  [1.091]  
College + -4.026 *** -4.098 *** -3.433 *** -4.411 *** -3.606 *** 
 [0.961]  [0.966]  [0.958]  [0.968]  [0.980]  
Public Housing -0.497  -0.414  -0.498  -0.088  -0.295  
 [0.967]  [0.976]  [0.964]  [0.982]  [0.997]  
Constant 12.165 *** 12.499 *** 4.051 + 15.266 *** 5.239 * 
 [1.886]  [1.937]  [2.084]  [2.006]  [2.444]  
N 870  869   802   825   764   
NOTE: +P<.10, *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 
 
Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis: Willingness to Trade Off Rights, Odds Ratios, Neighborhood 
Fixed Effects Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Predictor  b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   
Past-Year Stops (any)       2.018 * 2.140 * 
       [0.647]  [0.696]  
Past-Year Stops (Number)      0.789 + 0.805  
       [0.110]  [0.113]  
NYPD stops lots or most kids      0.521 * 0.575 + 
       [0.168]  [0.186]  
Seen stop take place       1.063  1.147  
       [0.247]  [0.273]  
Perceived NYPD Legit.     1.107 ***   1.105 *** 
     [0.029]    [0.031]  
Perceived neighborhood danger  1.009      1.157  
   [0.087]      [0.109]  
Male 1.267  1.269  1.236  1.253  1.210  
 [0.252]  [0.253]  [0.249]  [0.257]  [0.251]  
Black 0.572 + 0.573 + 0.690  0.573 + 0.697  
 [0.181]  [0.181]  [0.226]  [0.184]  [0.231]  
Hispanic 1.041  1.040  1.112  1.017  1.081  
 [0.318]  [0.318]  [0.349]  [0.315]  [0.342]  
Asian 0.545  0.545  0.469  0.506  0.455  
 [0.360]  [0.360]  [0.314]  [0.337]  [0.308]  
Two or more Races 0.276 + 0.275 + 0.249 + 0.302  0.266  
 [0.215]  [0.214]  [0.197]  [0.237]  [0.215]  
Age 1.013  1.013  1.008  1.007  1.006  
 [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.010]  [0.010]  
< HS 1.450  1.450  1.598  1.529  1.649  
 [0.546]  [0.546]  [0.610]  [0.586]  [0.639]  
> HS but < college 1.539  1.541  1.670  1.504  1.653  
 [0.485]  [0.486]  [0.535]  [0.479]  [0.536]  
College + 1.738 + 1.741 + 1.881 * 1.605  1.799 + 
 [0.509]  [0.511]  [0.560]  [0.476]  [0.544]  
Public Housing 0.941  0.938  0.976  1.033  0.997  
 [0.295]  [0.296]  [0.310]  [0.329]  [0.324]  
Constant 0.094  0.093 + 0.026 ** 0.126  0.022 ** 
 [0.117]  [0.116]  [0.034]  [0.161]  [0.032]  
N 881   881   881   881   881   
NOTE: +P<.10, *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 
 
 
Table 10: Threshold for Police Misconduct, OLS Coefficients, Neighborhood Fixed Effects Models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Predictor  b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   b/se   
Past-Year Stops        -0.594  -0.063  
(any)       [0.893]  [0.870]  
Past-Year Stops (Number)      -0.193 + -0.130  
       [0.103]  [0.109]  
NYPD stops lots or most       -2.573 *** -1.059  
Kids       [0.994]  [1.016]  
Seen stop take        0.703  -0.002  
Place       [0.846]  [0.832]  
Perceived NYPD      0.715 ***   0.676 *** 
Legitimacy     [0.087]    [0.096]  
Perceived neighborhood   -0.402      0.284  
Danger   [0.307]      [0.309]  
Male -0.891  -0.957  -1.239 + -0.739  -1.108  
 [0.725]  [0.726]  [0.698]  [0.730]  [0.712]  
Black -2.752 * -2.826 ** -1.332  -2.593 * -1.328  
 [0.094]  [1.095]  [1.068]  [1.086]  [1.074]  
Hispanic 3.541 ** 3.609 ** 4.001 *** 3.583 ** 3.930 *** 
 [1.159]  [1.160]  [1.116]  [1.150]  [1.119]  
Asian 4.683 * 4.674 * 3.421  4.034 + 3.245  
 [2.241]  [2.240]  [2.162]  [2.225]  [2.165]  
Two or more Races -0.490  -0.420  -1.037  -0.772  -1.166  
 [2.035]  [2.034]  [1.959]  [2.021]  [1.967]  
Age 0.112 *** 0.109 *** 0.072 * 0.074 * 0.060 + 
 [0.033]  [0.033]  [0.032]  [0.034]  [0.033]  
< HS 1.481  1.436  1.639  1.786  1.818  
 [1.312]  [1.312]  [1.265]  [1.304]  [1.269]  
> HS but < college -2.959 ** -3.057 ** -2.622 * -2.822 ** -2.517 * 
 [1.085]  [1.087]  [1.047]  [1.075]  [1.051]  
College + -3.628 *** -3.730 *** -3.265 *** -3.636 *** -3.234 *** 
 [0.994]  [0.996]  [0.958]  [0.986]  [0.964]  
Public Housing -0.043  0.114  0.086  0.249  0.111  
 [1.039]  [1.045]  [0.998]  [1.032]  [1.007]  
Constant 9.845  10.209  1.352  11.596 + 2.142  
 [6.830]  [6.383]  [6.255]  [6.345]  [6.346]  
N 885  885   885   885   885   
Note: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 
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